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In the political and economic debate, income splitting 
for married couples is deemed as an important reason 
for the relatively low participation of married women in 
the labor market in Germany. Joint taxation may result 
in higher marginal tax rates for secondary wage earners 
depending on the spouse’s income.1 From a social or fa-
mily policy point of view, there is often criticism that 
income splitting for married couples does not support 
households with children but rather just marriages and 
should therefore be reconsidered.2 DIW Berlin has alrea-
dy shown in previous studies that the introduction of in-
dividual taxation for married couples would lead to gre-
ater effects on female labor supply (see box).3
alternatives to Income splitting for married 
couples
In contrast to Germany, many other countries (the UK, 
Sweden, The Netherlands, Spain, Portugal and Austria) 
have abolished joint taxation for married couples in fa-
vor of individual taxation. In these countries, there are, 
at the most, moderate tax deductions for non-earning 
spouses or tax credits.4
1  See Steiner, V. and K.  Wrohlich, “Household Taxation, Income Splitting 
and Labor Supply Incentives. A Microsimulation Study for Germany,” CESifo 
Economic Studies 50 (3), (2004): 541–568; and Steiner,  V. and K. Wrohlich, 
“Die Wirkung ausgewählter familienpolitischer Instrumente auf das 
Arbeitsangebot von Eltern. Expertise für den Familienbericht im Auftrag der 
Bundesregierung,” DIW Berlin: Politikberatung Kompakt no. 16. (Berlin: 2006).
2  Some years ago, income splitting for families in Germany was discussed as 
an alternative to income splitting for married couples. See Steiner, V. and K.  
Wrohlich, “Familiensplitting begünstigt einkommensstarke Familien, geringe 
Auswirkungen auf das Arbeitsangebot,” Wochenbericht des DIW Berlin no. 31 
(2006).
3  Steiner and Wrohlich, “Household Taxation”; Dearing, H., H. Hofer, C. Lietz,   
R. Winter-Ebmer, and K. Wrohlich, “Why are mothers working longer hours in 
Austria than in Germany? A comparative microsimulation analysis,” Fiscal 
Studies, 28 (4), (2007): 463–495.
4  See Dingeldey, I., “Das deutsche System der Ehegattenbesteuerung im 
europäischen Vergleich,” WSI Mitteilungen 3/2002, (2005): 154–160; OECD 
“Taxing Working Families: A Distributional Analysis,” OECD Tax Policy Study No. 
12. (Paris: 2005).
The joint taxation of married couples in Germany with full income 
splitting is still a major hindrance to the participation of married wo-
men in the labor market. In their current financial proposals, the SPD 
(Social Democratic Party) is calling for income splitting for married 
couples to be replaced by individual taxation with maintenance de-
ductions, in accordance with existing schemes for divorced spouses. 
Simulations implemented by DIW Berlin show that such a reform 
would only have limited effects on distribution and labor supply. 
Pure individual taxation, however, would not only lead to significant 
additional tax revenue but would also considerably increase the 
number of married women participating in the labor market. If poli-
ticians take the goal of greater integration of married women in the 
labor market seriously, then the current income splitting for married 
couples would have to be replaced by individuation taxation.
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The divorced spouse receiving the maintenance must 
then be taxed on these maintenance payments as in-
come.
This form of taxation for divorced spouses may also be 
referred to as “limited de facto splitting.” The introduc-
tion of such limited de facto splitting instead of income 
splitting for married couples has been proposed in the 
past by various political players. During the SPD/Green 
coalition negotiations in 2002, for example, it was dis-
cussed whether spouses ought to be able to transfer a 
maximum of EUR 20,000 to each other so that income 
differentials of EUR 40,000 could still be offset.6
6  See also studies by DIW Berlin showing that the labor supply effects of 
such a reform would be minimal compared to individual taxation, Steiner and 
Wrohlich (2004).
However, the abolition of joint taxation for married cou-
ples using income splitting and the introduction of indi-
vidual taxation are viewed critically in Germany from a 
constitutional standpoint.5 An adjudication by the Fede-
ral Constitutional Court concluded that single-earner, 
married couples must be granted at least twice the ba-
sic allowance in order keep the joint subsistence mini-
mum of married couples tax-free. Without further re-
gulations, married couples would be worse off than di-
vorced spouses in taxation terms. Under current law, 
divorced spouses who pay their former partners main-
tenance may deduct these maintenance payments from 
their taxable income up to a maximum of EUR 13,806 
per annum. 
5  See overview outlines in Vollmer, F. Das Ehegattensplitting: Eine 
verfassungsrechtliche Untersuchung der Einkommensbesteuerung von 
Eheleuten. Baden-Baden. 1998; Spangenberg, U. “Neuorientierung   der 
Ehebesteuerung: Ehegattensplitting und Lohnsteuerverfahren,” (Hans-Böckler-
Stiftung, Arbeitspapier, 2005): 106.
Box 
the Effect of Income splitting for married couples1
 
In Germany, married couples are taxed using the 
income splitting method. In the case of joint taxation, 
the entire taxable income of both spouses is halved, the 
resulting attributable income tax calculated, and then 
the tax payable is doubled. This regulation ensures that 
the tax liability of a married couple is irrespective of 
the distribution of income within the household. This re-
sults in an equal tax liability for households with equal 
incomes. Using a progressive tax rate results in a "split-
ting advantage" over unmarried couples with the same 
household income. The reason for this is that using the 
splitting system, two basic allowances are taken into 
account for each married couple. This also applies even 
if one spouse has made no taxable income. Secondly, 
by fictitiously halving taxable income, the progression 
of the income tax is reduced. The splitting advantage 
is greater, the higher the household income and the 
greater the difference between the individual incomes 
of the spouses. The maximum splitting advantage 
under the tax rate in 2005 was around EUR 8,000. 
This was achieved with a taxable annual income of 
more than EUR 100,000. Due to the introduction of the 
wealth tax in 2007, the maximum splitting advantage 
1  Steiner and Wrohlich, “Familiensplitting."
for married couples with taxable incomes of over EUR 
250,000 continued to rise and now has a maximum of 
about EUR 15,000 per annum  for incomes of over EUR 
500,000. The splitting advantage decreases rapidly 
when the other spouse increasingly contributes to hou-
sehold income and disappears when both spouses have 
the same income.2
The splitting procedure, in the strict sense, only refers 
to income tax rates for the joint taxation of married 
couples. In addition, there are additional benefits to 
determining the taxable income of spouses jointly 
rather than individually, particularly for expenses of a 
provident nature, savings allowances, and lump sums. 
Furthermore, spouses can offset profits and losses 
against one another. These benefits also cease to exist 
in individual taxation.
2  For a detailed explanation of the effects of income splitting for married 
couples on tax revenue and distribution, see Bach, S., H. Buslei, D. 
Svindland, H. Baumgartner, J. Platt, and D. Teichmann, “Untersuchungen zu 
den Wirkungen der gegenwärtigen Ehegattenbesteuerung auf Grundlage 
von fortgeschriebenen Einzeldaten der Einkommensteuerstatistik,” 
Projektbericht 2 zur Forschungskooperation „Mikrosimulation“ mit dem 
Bundesministerium der Finanzen: (DIW Berlin, 2003). 70.; Bach, S. and H.  
Buslei, “Fiskalische Wirkungen einer Reform der Ehegattenbesteuerung,” 
Wochenbericht des DIW Berlin no. 22. (2003).15 DIW Economic Bulletin 5.2011
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current Proposal by the sPD
In its new financial policy plan, the SPD is currently 
proposing to introduce “individual taxation with main-
tenance deductions” for future marriages. This alterna-
tive corresponds to the limited de facto splitting descri-
bed above: the higher-income spouse can, as is current-
ly possible for divorced spouses, transfer a maximum 
income of EUR 13,806 per annum to the lower-income 
spouse. This means that a difference in income of up 
to EUR 27,612 can be offset. All married couples whe-
re the difference in income between the spouses is less 
than this amount are therefore not affected by this re-
form. For all other couples, the limit of transmissible 
income for the splitting advantage would be capped at 
a maximum of EUR 5,100 per annum.
Figures 1 and 2 show the variation of the splitting ad-
vantage depending on the taxable income of the hou-
sehold and the distribution of income between spouses. 
Figure 1 illustrates the tax savings achievable with cur-
rent income splitting for married couples compared to 
individual taxation. Couples in which one partner ea-
rns 100 percent of the total taxable income benefit most 
from income splitting. For such households, the split-
ting advantage increases until a top tax rate of 42 per-
cent is achieved. After this point, the advantage remains 
constant up to a taxable income of EUR 250,000, after 
which it continues to increase due to the wealth tax (top 
tax rate of 45 percent) until it reaches the maximum va-
lue of over EUR 15,000 per annum. Figure 2 shows the 
tax savings possible with the SPD’s proposal compared 
to individual taxation. The individual taxation proposal 
with deductions for maintenance still affords signifi-
cant splitting advantages.
Empirical analysis of Individual taxation 
with and without maintenance Deductions
DIW Berlin has empirically examined the effect of in-
dividual taxation with maintenance deductions propo-
sed by the SPD and compared its effects on distributi-
on and labor supply with those expected from the int-
roduction of pure individual taxation. In contrast to the 
SPD’s proposal, however, we have assumed that this re-
form would apply to all marriages and not just for fu-
ture marriages. In the short term, limiting the propo-
sal to future marriages only would lead to virtually no 
change in the status quo.
For the empirical analysis, we used a microsimulation 
model with behavioral adaptation. In addition to a de-
tailed depiction of the German tax and transfer system, 
the Tax-Benefit Microsimulation Model, STSM, includes 
Figure 1
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The splitting advantage is greatest for single-wage-earner married couples. 
Figure 2
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all married households. We only estimate second round 
effects for married couples where both partners are po-
tentially dependently employed, that is, not in training, 
self-employment or retirement.
In the analyses, we disregard additional adjustment re-
actions by households, in particular, different design 
options in the distribution of income between spouses. 
These play an important role for recipients of profit and 
asset income. However, such designs usually only have 
limited weighting because spouses have to give up ow-
nership of the relevant assets, which may also incur 
gift tax, and tax offices may prohibit fraudulent con-
tracts. Such distributions of income can actually redu-
ce the additional revenue from a tax reform significant-
ly.9 But for the analysis considered here, they are not of 
significant importance because they are only relevant 
in few households.
significant Income Effects from Individual 
taxation
Table 1 shows the changes in net household income in 
EUR per month resulting from the introduction of indi-
vidual taxation compared to the current situation with in-
come splitting for married couples. Table 2 outlines the 
corresponding effects on net household income when 
individual taxation with maintenance deductions is ap-
plied. By definition, tax revenue from both reforms is 
higher than with income splitting for married couples. 
Therefore, net household income is also lower. In the 
following, we have assumed that additional revenue is 
not to be used for reductions in other taxes or increa-
ses in state benefits.
On average, net household income decreases by EUR 
119 per month with individual taxation (Table 1). Mar-
ried couples where only one spouse earns an income 
lose EUR 232 per month. They are therefore significant-
ly more affected than double-earning couples who have 
to suffer an average loss of only EUR 86. Married coup-
les in Western Germany benefit significantly more from 
income splitting for married couples than those in Eas-
tern Germany: On average, married couples in Western 
Germany lose EUR 134 per month through individual 
taxation, while in the East it is only EUR 50. This is due 
to the fact that there are more double-earning couples in 
the East; also, average incomes in the East are still lower 
than in the West. Furthermore, Table 1 shows that, in 
case of a transition to individual taxation, losses in net 
household income increase with higher incomes: mar-
9  Bach and Buslei, „Fiskalische Wirkungen.“
a micro-econometrically estimated labor supply model of 
private households in Germany.7 The database for this is 
the German Socio-Economic Panel Study (SOEP).8 We 
based our analysis on SOEP data from 2009 (v26).
The STSM can be used to calculate net income per hou-
sehold under the current legal framework of income 
splitting for married couples (status quo) and for the 
reform alternatives i) individual taxation with mainte-
nance deductions and ii) individual taxation from SOEP 
data. Consequently, we can quantify the income effects 
of the reforms. For the analysis, we initially assumed 
that the behavior of households does not change with 
the introduction of the reform. In addition to income 
changes (“first-round effects”), the STSM and econo-
metric behavior estimation can also be used to simula-
te and quantify the labor supply effects on married wo-
men and men induced by the respective reform (“second 
round” effects). The first round effects are calculated for 
7  Steiner V., K. Wrohlich, P. Haan, and J. Geyer, (2008): “Documentation of 
the Tax-Benefit Microsimulation Model STSM: Version 2008,” DIW Data 
Documentation No. 31. The model has already been used by DIW in other 
studies to analyze the effects of potential tax reforms on labor market behavior.
8  The SOEP is an annual representative survey of private households in 
Germany conducted by the DIW Berlin in cooperation with the fieldwork 
organization Infratest Sozialforschung. Wagner, G., J. Göbel, P. Krause, R. 
Pischner, and I. Sieber, “Das Sozio-oekonomische Panel (SOEP): Multidiszipli-
näres Haushaltspanel und Kohortenstudie für Deutschland—Eine Einführung 
(für neue Datennutzer) mit einem Ausblick (für erfahrene Nutzer),” AStA 
Wirtschafts- und Sozialstatistisches Archiv 2 (4), (2008): 301–328.
Table 1
Effects of Individual taxation on 
net household Income 
















25 000 34 70 48 39 18
 25 000 –  30 000 155 199 56 163 108
 30 000 –  40 000 151 212 68 161 98
 40 000 –  50 000 181 277 92 204 68
 50 000 –  75 000 166 349 76 178 91
 75 000 –  100 000 260 432 139 275 111
 100 000 and more 208 315 105 214 106
Total 119 232 86 134 50
1  Calculated on an annual basis.
Source: Calculations by DIW Berlin with the Tax-Benefit Microsimulation Model (STSM).
© DIW Berlin 2011
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dual taxation, the kink largely disappears so that part-
time employment above the mini-job threshold beco-
mes more attractive.
The lower part of Figure 3 shows the same scenario for a 
married couple with high wages. We have assumed that 
the man has a gross hourly wage of EUR 26.10 which 
corresponds to the 90-percent percentile of the distri-
bution of hourly wages for men. For the woman, we as-
sume an hourly rate of EUR 15.20, which corresponds 
to the 75-percent percentile of the distribution of hour-
ly wages for women. A transition to individual taxation 
with maintenance deductions has little impact on the 
budget line for such wages. The income in this case is 
slightly lower than income in the status quo. A transiti-
on to pure  individual taxation would result in a far gre-
ater impact on working incentives. As in the case of the 
married couple with a medium income, the kink at the 
mini-job threshold is also reduced and the steepness of 
the budget line right of this point increases.
The figure demonstrates that labor supply effects can be 
expected from both reform alternatives: since individu-
al taxation with maintenance deductions has very little 
impact on the working incentive, no appreciable labor 
effects would be achieved by its introduction. In cont-
rast, a transition to pure individual taxation would mas-
sively alter the working incentive in such a way that this 
reform would significantly increase labor supply.
ried couples with an income of less than EUR 25,000 
per annum would only lose EUR 34 per month, while 
married couples with an average income of over EUR 
100,000 would lose EUR 208.
The income effects of the introduction of individual taxa-
tion with maintenance deductions are significantly less 
(Table 2). On average, net household income decreases 
by only about EUR 25 per month. The differences bet-
ween individual household groups are, however, simi-
lar to the introduction of individual taxation. Single ea-
rners (EUR 59 per month) and households in Western 
Germany (EUR 29 per month) are significantly more 
affected than double earners (EUR 14) and households 
in Eastern Germany (EUR 8).
the labor supply Effects of Individual 
taxation are significantly greater
Before we show the results of the empirical analysis of 
labor supply effects from both reforms, we will first out-
line the changes in working incentives for women, using 
graphs. Figure 3 shows the net household income for a fa-
mily with two children, depending on the hours worked 
by the wife with a medium and high hourly wage.
The upper part of Figure 3 shows the net income of a 
married couple with a median wage: the man earns EUR 
16.00 per hour, the woman EUR 12.30. We assume that 
the man is in full-time employment. For this couple, the-
re is no change with a transition from the status quo to 
individual taxation with maintenance deductions. The 
difference in the taxable income of both spouses is ac-
tually less than EUR 27,600, in the event that the wo-
man is not in employment, so this household is not sub-
ject to any additional taxation burden and, therefore, 
there is no change in the working incentive. A transiti-
on to individual taxation would, however, have signifi-
cant implications for this household. On the one hand, 
in this scenario it loses income of EUR 250 per month 
if the woman only works for a few hours. On the other 
hand, the “budget line” becomes significantly steeper: 
for every hour the wife works  more, the greater the in-
come the household gets compared to the current sys-
tem of income splitting for married couples. This in-
creases the working incentive. Moreover, the kink in 
the budget line, which is caused by the EUR 400 mini-
job limit, is reduced. Income below the mini-job limit 
is tax-free and all income above this threshold is taxab-
le. Therefore, not only does social security apply from 
this limit, but also income tax. The resulting kink in 
the budget line implies that a household just below the 
mini-job threshold has more income than a household 
that lies just above the threshold. In the case of indivi-
Table 2
Effects of Individual taxation with maintenance Deductions on 
net household Income
















25 000 2 9 6 2 1
 25 000 –  30 000 21 32 8 23 13
 30 000 –  40 000 22 36 8 23 15
 40 000 –  50 000 29 54 10 33 11
 50 000 –  75 000 39 102 9 42 18
 75 000 –  100 000 95 182 37 100 36
 100 000 and more 92 159 35 95 40
Total 25 59 14 29 8
1  Calculated on an annual basis.
Source: Calculations by DIW Berlin with the Tax-Benefit Microsimulation Model (STSM).
© DIW Berlin 2011
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According to our calculations, there would be signi-
ficant consequences for both men and women if they 
were taxed individually. The participation rate of women 
would increase by about 2.4 percentage points, while for 
men this figure would decrease by about 0.3 percentage 
points. The average working hours of women would in-
crease by about 7.4 percent and decrease by 1.5 percent 
for men.10 The large difference between men and wo-
men can be explained by the lower labor supply elastici-
ties among men. In general, this means that labor sup-
ply for men would change significantly less than for wo-
men if there was a change in income.
An increase in working hours and participation rates 
among women is more prevalent in Western Germany. 
However, the female labor supply in Eastern Germany 
only changes minimally. Again, the reason for this is 
that there are significantly more double-earner couples 
in Eastern Germany and that income inequalities bet-
ween spouses in Eastern Germany are lower than in 
Western Germany.
conclusion
The empirical analysis of the labor supply effects of the 
SPD’s proposal to introduce individual taxation with 
maintenance deductions shows that anticipated chan-
ges in the participation of married women in employ-
ment are low. This is because, due to maintenance de-
ductions, differences in income up to EUR 27,612 can 
continue to be offset between the spouses.
In contrast, a transition to individual taxation would have 
significantly greater effects on the labor supply of marri-
ed women. We find an appreciable increase in both the 
participation rate and the average hours worked. This 
shows that the current taxation of spouses has stron-
gly negative consequences on the working incentive for 
married women.
According to our calculations, the introduction of indivi-
dual taxation for income tax would generate annual tax 
revenues (including the solidarity surcharge) of about 
EUR 27 billion, which is still more than ten percent of 
income tax revenue and about 1.1 percent of gross do-
mestic product. The additional revenues are almost five 
times as high as those of individual taxation with main-
tenance deductions (approximately EUR 5.5 billion per 
10  An earlier study by DIW Berlin calculated higher labor supply effects for 
the transition from income splitting for married couples to individual taxation 
(Steiner and Wrohlich, “Household Taxation”). This study was based on SOEP 
data from 2002. At that time, the participation rates and average hours worked 
by women were significantly lower. This explains the lower effects in the current 
study.
Table 3 outlines the estimated labor supply effects on in-
dividual taxation and on individual taxation with main-
tenance deductions. They are significantly higher with 
individual taxation than for individual taxation with 
maintenance deductions. The latter increases the par-
ticipation rate of married women in our population of 
around 73 percent by about 0.7 percentage points and 
increases the average hours of work carried out by the-
se women at around 20 hours per week by about 2.4 
percent. For men, we find hardly any labor supply ef-
fects in this case.
Figure 3
net household Income in EuR per month Related to the number 

























Working hours of the wife (per week)


























Income splitting for married couples
Individual taxation with 
maintenance deductions
at a high hourly wage
Income splitting for married couples
Individual taxation with 
maintenance deductions
Individual taxation
Working hours of the wife (per week)
Working hours of the wife (per week)
Note: The figure above shows the net household income for a married couple with median wages of 
EUR16.00 per hour for the man and EUR 12.30 per hour for the woman. In the lower figure, wages of EUR 
26.10 per hour for men and EUR 15.20 per hour for the woman are assumed.
Source: Calculations by DIW Berlin with the Tax-Benefit Microsimulation Model (STSM).
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annum). This additional revenue could be used for fis-
cal consolidation, as well as to reduce tax progression 
in the lower income brackets, to reduce other taxes and 
duties, or for increased state benefits.
If the economic goal is to better integrate married wo-
men into the labor market and, therefore, contribute to 
the long-term demographic development of the poten-
tial labor force, then conflicting incentives in the tax 
and benefits systems should be systematically removed. 
The plan proposed by the SPD for reforming joint taxa-
tion for married couples would only make a very minor 
contribution to this. In particular, this is true if the re-
form—in contrast to our calculations—only applies to 
future marriages. Constitutional objections to individu-
al taxation should not be given too much weight. By in-
ternational comparison, there are many countries with 
completely or largely individual income taxation which 
give no or only minimal benefits to spouses with no in-
come of their own.
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Change in the participation rate (in percentage points)
All couples 2.37 0.73 –0.27 –0.02
West  2.83 0.87 –0.33 –0.03
East 0.76 0.22 –0.06 0.00
Change in average working hours (in percent)
All couples 7.38 2.44 –1.50 –0.22
West  8.65 2.89 –1.82 –0.29
East 2.89 0.86 –0.38 0.00
Source: Calculations by DIW Berlin with the Tax-Benefit Microsimulation Model (STSM).
© DIW Berlin 2011
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